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Harold M. Smith Q.C.* Walking the Centre Line: Balancing
Joseph L. Anthony** an Employee's Right to Privacy in
Drug and Alcohol Policies in the
Atlantic Offshore Oil Industry
Should the principles applied to drug and alcohol testing on land be imported into
the Atlantic offshore oil and gas industry? The authors take the position that there is
room for the notion that the application of principles derived from safety sensitive land
based industry ought not to be applied in a perfunctory or rote manner to the Atlantic
offshore environment. The case law, since Entrop, shows a judicial tendency to apply
the requirements established by the obiter dictum of Entrop. (Etrop dealt with safety
sensitive but land-based industry.) The danger is that the principles, as developed by
and since Entrop, may be applied by adjudicators perfunctorily without due regard to
the unique and supervenient risks inherent in the offshore marine environment. The
authors propose that aspects of drug and alcohol testing policies directed at manag-
ing the risks of impairment in the Atlantic offshore environment should be found to
be valid notwithstanding that the same policies may, in land based safety sensitive
industries, encounter difficulty under current interpretation of relevant statutes such
as humans rights legislation.
Les principes appliqu6s aux tests de d6pistage de la consommation de stup6fiants et
d'alcool effectues sur la terre ferme doivent-ils s'appliquer a I'industrie p6troliere en
zone extrac6tiere? Les auteurs adoptent la position qu'il existe une latitude suffisante
pour que les principes d6riv6s de ceux qui ont cours dans une industrie non mari-
time ot) la securit6 est primordiale ne soient pas appliques sans discernement dans
I'environnement extrac6tier atlantique. Depuis la d6cision Entrop, la jurisprudence
r6vele une coh6rence des tribunaux a appliquer - a une industrie terrestre ob la s6cu-
rit6 est primordiale - des critres 6nonc6s dans I'obiter dictum de la d6cision Entrop.
Cette coherence judiciaire pr~sente cependant un danger: les principes 61abor6s
dans la d6cision Entrop et par la suite pourraient 6tre appliques aveugl6ment par
des arbitres, sans que les risques uniques et particuliers inherents a I'environnement
marin aient 6t6 6valu6s. Les auteurs avancent que certains volets des politiques sur
les tests de d6pistage de la consommation de stup6fiants et d'alcool - politiques
visant a permettre de g6rer les risques li6s a I'affaiblissement des facult6s en zone
extrac6tiere - doivent 6tre consid6r6s valides et ce, bien qu'il puisse 6tre difficile, 6
cause de I'interpr6tation actuelle de certaines lois (par exemple, les lois sur les droits
de la personne) d'appliquer les m~mes politiques dans des industries non maritimes
ob la securit6 est primordiale.
* Partner, Stewart McKelvey Stirling Scales, St. John's, NL.
** Associate, Stewart McKelvey Stirling Scales, St. John's, NL.
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Introduction
The oil industry is a high risk business. An accident... could create a
catastrophic incident resulting in injury and death to employees, to the
public and to the environment. The Exxon Valdez was a prime example.
Drug or alcohol abuse by oil rig workers magnifies tremendously the
job's inherent dangers.
2
[T]he use of a person's body without... consent to obtain
information.., invades an area of personal privacy essential to
the maintenance of.. . human dignity.
Canadians think of their bodies as the outward manifestation of them-
selves. It is considered to be uniquely important and uniquely theirs. Any
invasion of the body is an invasion of the particular person. Indeed, it is
the ultimate invasion of personal dignity and privacy. 3
The foregoing excerpts capture the quintessential nature of the equally
valid, yet potentially conflicting interests facing employers in the Atlantic
offshore oil industry. Although the potential consequences of an offshore
incident due to impaired performance include loss of life, environmen-
tal damage and economic loss, prevailing jurisprudence mandates that
risk management policies utilizing drug and alcohol testing be balanced
against employee privacy rights, an issue complicated in the offshore by
the necessity of billeting employees on-site.
Three years have passed since the Ontario Court of Appeal re-
leased its decision in Entrop v. Imperial Oil Ltd.,4 suggested by some
commentators as having dealt "a serious blow" to drug and alcohol
1. Walker v. Imperial Oil Ltd., 1998 CarswellAlta 859 at para. 84 (Alta. Q.B.) (eC).
2. Sandersv. Parker Drilling Co., 911 F.2d 191 (91 Cir. 1990) at 213.
3. R. v. Monney, 1999 CarswellOnt 935 at para. 44 (S.C.C.) (eC) [Monney].
4. [2000] O.J. No. 2689 (C.A.) (QL) [Entrap].
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testing in the workplace.5 While the ultimate impact of Entrop remains
to be seen, it nevertheless marked a judicial watershed. The jurispru-
dence subsequent to Entrop reflects a remarkable consistency in the
approach of courts, arbitrators, and human rights tribunals in
delineating what is and is not acceptable in workplace drug and alcohol
testing.
Though most of the cases come from outside the oil industry, the
approach taken by adjudicators in balancing employee privacy with reason-
able measures to prevent workplace impairment in risk-sensitive enterprises
will undoubtedly influence the resolution of similar issues in the offshore
context. These authorities provide a necessary guidepost not only to legal
principles, but for distinguishing by comparison the unique circumstances
in the offshore. A review of Canadian authorities reveals emerging trends,
particularly since the release of Entrop, including the differential treatment
of employees in safety as opposed to non-safety sensitive positions, the legal
limits on drug and alcohol testing, what constitutes reasonable cause to re-
quire employees to undergo drug or alcohol testing, the ability to conduct
investigatory searches of employees and their possessions and, perhaps
most importantly, the identification and response to disciplinary or accom-
modative issues or both relating to employee drug and alcohol use.
The implications of the ever-increasing judicial consistency in the
treatment of workplace drug and alcohol testing, while generally a posi-
tive development, nonetheless warrant a note of caution for employers in
the offshore oil industry. To date, existing jurisprudence governing this
area of law has developed solely in connection with land-based indus-
tries. Though, to a degree, comparisons can be drawn between land-based
refineries or petrochemical plants and offshore oil rigs or production
platforms, one need only consider the tragedy of the Ocean Ranger, or
the environmental despoilation caused by the Exxon Valdez, to appreci-
ate the added risks entailed in conducting operations two hundred miles
offshore in an area renowned for cold temperatures, severe and unpredict-
able weather, and icebergs. Even with the best equipment and most rigor-
ous safety procedures, employees in the offshore live with the knowledge
that in the event of a crisis, evacuation may pose its own risks. Unlike
land-based industries, adverse weather conditions may impede rescue
personnel from responding to emergent situations in the offshore. Oil spills
on land, while serious, pale in comparison to the catastrophic aftermath of
5. See e.g. Russell W. Zinn & Patricia P. Brethour, The Law of Human Rights in Canada: Practice
and Procedure, looseleaf (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book Inc., 2002) at para. 5.50.
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an offshore oil spill to the marine environment as well as to fishing and
other industries dependent on that natural resource. Current jurisprudence
on workplace drug and alcohol programs has yet to consider the superve-
nient nature of the risks inherent in the offshore oil industry. The question,
therefore arises how steps taken by employers to minimize environmental
and economic devastation and the risk to life due to an incident caused by
workplace impairment should be balanced against employee privacy.
The following analysis examines the development of the law in this
area and the emerging trends in the judicial approach to workplace drug
and alcohol issues with a focus on the Atlantic offshore oil industry. In the
authors' view while the significance of employee privacy cannot be under-
valued, it is nonetheless an interest that must be subjugated to reasonably
imposed measures to minimize the enormity of foreseeable risks flowing
from an impairment-related incident in the offshore.
I. Ideology of Competing Interests
As a general rule an employer may not inquire into or interfere with an
employee's off-duty conduct or impose discipline as a result of such
conduct absent a substantial and legitimate business reason.6 The
underlying rationale is, of course, based upon a recognition of the inher-
ent value we all place on personal autonomy. As noted by the board in
Re Provincial-American Truck Transporters and Teamsters Union, Local
880 (Provincial-American) in considering mandatory drug and alcohol
testing by urinalysis:
There is a further aspect to the privacy argument in that, even assum-
ing that the urine specimen is not used to determine anything other than
whether there has been any past ingestion of alcohol and/or drugs, such
testing necessarily involves the employer in an inquiry into what an em-
ployee is doing in his/her off-duty hours. Most reasonable people would
probably consider that it was none of their employer's business if they
happened to drink wine or beer with their meals away from work or enjoy
a drink or two in their off-duty hours.'
6. See generally Donald J. M. Brown & David M. Beatty, Canadian Labour Arbitration, 3d ed.,
looseleaf (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book Inc., 2003) at para. 7:3010 and cases cited therein; see
especially Re Lumber & Sawmill Workers' Union, Local 2537andKVP Co. Ltd. (1965), 16 L.A.C. 73
(Robinson et al.) [KVP].
7. (1991), 18 L.A.C. (4th) 412 (Brent et al.) [Provincial-American].
8. Ibid. at 422.
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Although "privacy" is conceptually elusive in that it has different
connotations for everyone,9 it is irrefutable that the core value is inherent
and fundamental for most of us. The Supreme Court of Canada has opined
that "society has come to realize that privacy is at the heart of liberty in
a modern state ... [g]rounded in man's physical and moral autonomy,
privacy is essential for the well-being of the individual."' 0 The impor-
tance attributed to an individual's privacy rights by the judiciary is further
reflected by statutory enactments codifying the right to privacy, including
the collection, use and disclosure of personal information."
Given the right to privacy's preeminence, it is no surprise that some
proponents of privacy regard workplace drug and alcohol testing as
"chemical McCarthyism"" or an attempt by employers to open a "chemi-
cal window" to off-duty conduct. 3 As noted by a particularly literal United
States Court: Drug testing is a form of surveillance, albeit a technological
one ... It reports on a person's off duty activities just as sure as someone
had been present and watching. It is George Orwell's "'Big Brother'
society come to life."'1 4 Rhetoric aside, drug and alcohol testing, whether
through urinalysis or blood testing, is capable of revealing any number
of personal attributes, including pregnancy, manic depression, diabetes,
schizophrenia, heart trouble, and whether someone is HIV positive."
Trite though it may sound, society is an exercise in the art of compro-
mise and there are a plethora of situations in which the collective interest
must prevail over individual rights. In the context of workplace drug and
alcohol testing, the legitimacy of an employer's interest in preventing
off-duty conduct that could impair the performance of safety-sensitive
duties is one such scenario. As noted by the Board in Re Canadian Nation-
al Railway Company and Canadian Auto Workers, United Transportation
Workers Interveners: 16
9. Canada, Parliamentary Inquiry, Report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Hu-
man Rights and the Status of Persons with Disabilities (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1997) at 5-10.
10. R. v. Dyment, 1988 CarswellPEI 7 at para. 28 (S.C.C.) (eC).
11. See especially the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000,
c. 5. While it is beyond the scope of this analysis to fully detail the extent of an employer's obliga-
tions under the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, this legislation does
impose certain obligations on employers in the offshore oil industry, particularly in relation to the
disclosure of information concerning drug and alcohol tests administered to employees.
12. Douglas Isbister, "Justifying Employee Drug Testing: Privacy Rights" (1996) 5 Dal. J. Leg.
Stud. 255 at 256.
13. Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace (To-
ronto: Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1992) at 31.
14. Ibid. at 31, quoting from Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F Supp. 1507 at 1511 (D.N.J. 1986).
15. Report on Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace, supra note 13 at 11-12.
16. (2000), 95 L.A.C. (4th) 341 (Picher) [Canadian National, 2000].
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[T]here are certain industries which by their very nature are so highly
safety sensitive as to justify a high degree of caution on the part of an
employer without first requiring an extensive history of documented prob-
lems of substance abuse in the workplace. Few would suggest that the
operator of the nuclear generating plant must await a near meltdown,
or that an airline must produce documentation of a sufficient number
of inebriated pilots at the controls of wide-bodied aircraft, before tak-
ing firm and forceful steps to insure a substance-free workplace, by a
range of means that may include recourse to reasonable grounds drug and
alcohol testing. The more highly risk sensitive an enterprise is, the more
an employer can, in my view, justify a pro-active, rather than a reactive,
approach designed to prevent a problem before it manifests itself. 7
When one considers the inherently dangerous nature of working on an
offshore oil rig or platform, the potential for loss of life and environmental
despoilation, few would not argue that employers in the offshore have
a legitimate interest in preventing workplace impairment. Additionally,
beyond safety-related interests, it has been suggested that other benefits
accrue from workplace drug and alcohol testing, including: a reduction in
the demand for illicit drugs, early identification of health problems in the
persons being tested, identification of dependency-related problems and
early referral to employee assistance programs,' 8 reduction of health care
costs, promotion of efficiency, and global harmonization of operational
requirements for enterprises in the international market.'9
The issue, as in all cases, is how an employer's legitimate interest
in preventing workplace impairment can be pursued without completely
extinguishing employees' privacy rights. To fully appreciate the juridical
response to this dilemma, manifested in the "balancing-of-interests" test,
it is necessary, before exploring its specific application to the offshore,
to examine the genesis and development of the law in this area and the
impact of human rights legislation.
II. Early Jurisprudence on Drug and Alcohol Testing
The current proliferation of workplace drug and alcohol testing in risk-
sensitive operations belies the fact that the issue is relatively new to
Canadian jurisprudence. Surfacing in the late 1980s, the first cases arose
17. Ibid. at 378.
18. Canadian National, 2000, ibid. at 379-380; Re Dupont Canada Inc. and CEP Local 28-0
(2002), 105 L.A.C. (4th) 399 at 419 (Picher et al.) [Dupont].
19. Canada, Privacy Commissioner, Drug Testing and Privacy (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and
Services Canada, 1990) at 5-8.
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in the context of unionized public carriers. In the absence of specific
jurisprudence, arbitrators addressed the issue by analogy to cases dealing
with unilaterally imposed employer rules regarding mandatory medical
examinations to ensure fitness for duty and the search of employees and
their possessions to combat theft. Although the application of human
rights legislation was not considered in these early decisions, arbitrators
nonetheless adopted a "balancing-of-interests" approach in assessing the
legitimacy of workplace drug and alcohol testing.
20
Re Canadian Pacific Ltd. and United Transportation Union (Canadian
Pacific)21 is indicative of the approach taken in early arbitral jurisprudence.
In that case, the grievor was a conductor who was discharged following
his refusal to undergo a drug test after the employer became aware that he
had been charged criminally for cultivating marijuana. Though the grievor
had a clean disciplinary record, it was accepted by both parties that he
held a safety-sensitive position. Interestingly, the employer had no drug
and alcohol testing policy, but sought to impose drug testing as a means of
reducing the risk of workplace impairment.
The essence of the Board's decision in Canadian Pacific was that the
employer's right to require an employee to undergo a medical examina-
tion to ensure fitness for duty necessarily entailed a right to require a drug
test where an employee's duties are inherently safety-sensitive and there
are "reasonable grounds" to suspect she or he may be impaired on duty.22
The absence of a formal drug and alcohol testing policy was largely
irrelevant. Reasonable grounds existed as the grievor's admitted cultiva-
tion of marijuana suggested a continued pattern of use.23 Nevertheless, the
Board cautioned that "it is not within the legitimate business purposes of
an employer, including a railroad company, to encroach on the privacy and




20. Morton Mitchnick & Brian Etherington, Leading Cases on Labour Arbitrations, looseleaf (To-
ronto: Lancaster House, 2002) at s. 13.4.2.
21. (1987), 31 L.A.C. (3d) 179 (Picher) [Canadian Pacific].
22. Ibid. at 184-186.
23. See also Re Procor Sulphur Services and Communications, Energy and Paperworkers, Local
57 (1998), 79 L.A.C. (4th) 341 (Ponak et al) [Procor]. In that case, the Board found that random
drug testing was justifiably required of employees who occupied safety-sensitive positions and were
charged or reasonably suspected of having cultivated illicit drugs. At page 35 1, the Board stated: "In
the final analysis, the Board's reasoning, stripping away all legal complexities is fairly simple - if
you grow substantial amounts of marijuana for your own use and you occupy a safety sensitive work
position, your employer will have the right to test you for drug use." See also Fluor, infra note 75. In
Fluor, it was held that an admission by an employee to repeated off-duty drug use gave rise to reason-
able grounds to suspect workplace impairment so as to justify the imposition of random drug testing.
24. Supra note 21 at 187.
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In applying the reasoning in Canadian Pacific, arbitrators added
another dimension to the analysis by assessing the reasonableness of work-
place drug and alcohol testing through a balancing of interests approach
typified by Provincial-American." In that case, the issue was whether an
employer could require mandatory universal drug and alcohol testing
where the collective agreement provided that employees must consent to
a medical examination if and when requested. The Board acknowledged
that there was a legitimate and pressing interest to insure that employees
in safety-sensitive positions work free from impairment, but noted that
"the public good does not reasonably require a wholesale disregard for
personal liberty."26
In considering the legitimacy of a policy of mandatory universal drug
and alcohol testing, the Board applied the long-standing criteria used to
assess the legitimacy of unilaterally imposed rules as established in Re
Lumber & Sawmill Workers' Union, Local 2537 and KVP Co. Ltd. (KVP),
namely that:
A rule unilaterally introduced by the company, and not subsequently
agreed to by the union, must satisfy the following requisites:
1. It must not be inconsistent with the collective agreement;
2. It must not be unreasonable;
3. It must be clear and unequivocal;
4. It must be brought to the attention of the employee affected before
the company can act on it;
5. The employee concerned must have been notified that a breach of
such rule could result in his discharge if the rule is used as a founda-
tion for discharge; and
6. Such rule should have been consistently enforced by the company
from the time it was introduced.
27
The "reasonableness" component of the KVP test is predicated on a
proportionality between the extent to which an employer-imposed rule is
necessary to protect a legitimate interest of the employer and the impact
of said rule upon an employee's interests. 28 To apply the second branch
of the KVP test imparts a two-step inquiry one must first, assess whether
there is adequate cause or justification for the rule (i.e., a legitimate
25. Supra note 7.
26. Supra note 7 at 424.
27. KVP, supra note 6 at 85.
28. Canadian Labour Arbitration, supra note 6 at para. 4:1554 and cases cited therein.
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employer interest to be protected or objective facilitated by the operation
of the rule), and second, assess the reasonableness of the rule by consid-
ering whether the employer's interest could be protected or facilitated in
a less intrusive fashion.29 Under the KVP test, the greater the infringe-
ment of a rule on an employee's off-duty conduct, the more pressing and
substantial must be the employer's interest if the rule is to be upheld as a
legitimate exercise of management rights. The same analysis applies to
assessing discipline imposed as a consequence of breaching such a rule.30
As drug and alcohol policies necessarily restrict off-duty conduct that
results in workplace impairment, the application of the KVP test places
a high burden on employers to justify such policies as being reasonably
necessary to protect a legitimate interest.
Applying KVP, the Board in Provincial-American found universal
mandatory drug and alcohol testing to be manifestly unreasonable, though
reasonable cause testing for employees in safety-sensitive positions would
be permitted if based upon objective indicia of impairment. In reaching
its conclusion, the Board noted that there was no evidence of a substance
abuse problem in the workforce and no indication that the existing medi-
cal certification processes were ineffective in curbing on-duty impairment.
While this aspect of the holding in Provincial-American under the second
branch of the KVP test suggests that drug and alcohol testing [except
for reasonable cause] is permitted only as a response to documented
substance abuse problems in the workplace,31 recent authorities have
accepted that employers in risk-sensitive enterprises can take a proactive
approach to managing the risk of workplace impairment.
32
The impact of KVP on employers in risk-sensitive industries is that
29. See e.g. Re Esso Petroleum and Communications, Energy & Paperworkers' Union, Local 614
(1994), 56 L.A.C. (4th) 440; [1994] B.C.C.A.A.A. No. 244 (McAlpine et al.) [Esso].
30. Re Trimac Transportation Services - Bulk Systems and Transportation Communications Union
(1999), 88 L.A.C. (4th) 237 (Burkett) [Trimac]. At page 258 in that decision, the Board held that:
"while the debate centres on the reconciliation of two competing interests, the contractual mechanism
for determining which of the competing interests is to be given effect is the just cause provision. If an
employer rule or policy is to have teeth, it is by means of the employer's power to discipline. Employ-
ees who disregard or otherwise refuse to comply with an employer rule or policy leave themselves
open to discipline. However, discipline can only be imposed for just cause such that it is open to a
union to challenge the enforceability of a rule or policy as constituting an unwarranted invasion of
privacy."
31. See e.g. Re C.H. Heist Ltd. and E.C.W.U., Local 848 (1991), 20 L.A.C. (4th) 112 (Verity) [Heist]
and Procor, supra note 23.
32. Canadian National, 2000, supra note 16 at 378; Dupont, supra note 18 at 416; Re Continental
Lime Ltd. and International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers
and Helpers, Local D575 (2002), 105 LA.C. (4th) 263 (Freedman) [Continental Lime].
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although there will always be a legitimate interest in avoiding the dire
consequences of accidents due to the impaired performance of safety-
sensitive duties, the legitimacy of workplace drug and alcohol testing
will turn on whether such testing is the least intrusive effective means of
preventing workplace impairment. If so, the intrusion on employee
privacy is justifiable. If not, the rule or portion thereof will be unenforce-
able as unreasonable. In that regard, "reasonableness" is determined on the
particular facts in each case, depending as much on the technology of drug
and alcohol testing and its manner of application, as on the industry and
employees to which it is applied.
Arbitrators utilizing the KVP criteria in assessing the reasonableness
of workplace drug and alcohol policies and their implementation led to
an emergence of identifiable trends in the early arbitral jurisprudence.
These trends included: acceptance of reasonable cause drug and alcohol
testing for employees in safety-sensitive positions (based on objective
indicia of impairment),33 prohibitions on mandatory universal drug and
alcohol testing34 and concomitant restriction of drug and alcohol testing to
employees engaged in safety-sensitive duties (even where universal test-
ing is required by a contract to which the employer is a party),35 acceptance
of whistle-blowing provisions requiring employees to report off-duty
conduct of co-workers that gives rise to a reasonable suspicion of work-
place impairment,36 acceptance of random drug and alcohol testing as a
condition of reinstatement following termination for workplace impair-
33. Heist, supra note 31 ; Canadian National, 2000, supra note 16; Esso, supra note 29; Re Metropol
Security, a division of Barnes Security Systems Ltd. and United Steelworkers of America, Local 5296
(1998), 69 L.A.C. (4th) 399 (Whitaker) [Metropol]. But see J.U.O.E., Local 793 v. Sarnia Cranes Ltd.,
1999 CarswellOnt 1951 (OLRB) (eC) [Sarnia]. Sarnia is as yet the only reported decision in which a
policy that provided for reasonable cause drug testing was struck down in its entirety. In the authors'
view, the reasons in support of the ruling in Sarnia have been largely negated by the Ontario Court of
Appeal's ruling in Entrop; supra note 4.
34. Ibid.
35. Metropol, supra note 33, in which it was held that an employer cannot impose drug and alcohol
testing on employees engaged in non-safety-sensitive duties where the sole reason for so doing is
to meet a customer's request pursuant to a contract of service; Heist, supra note 3 1, in which it was
held that an employer could not suspend an employee in a non-safety-sensitive position following
suspected on-duty drug use at owner's request under terms of its drug and alcohol policy.
36. Canadian National, 2000, supra note 16 at 397. See also infra note 82, Occupational Health
and Safety Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c.O-3, s.6; Occupational Health and Safety Act, S.N.S. 1996, c.7,
s.17(2), which provisions require employees to inter alia "report immediately to his/her employer
or supervisor a hazardous condition when they come to his/her attention." But see Re Fording Coal
Limited and United Steel Workers of America, Local 7884 (2000), 88 L.A.C. (4th) 408 (Hope).
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ment or substance abuse,37 prohibitions on the imposition of automatic
disciplinary penalties for breach of a workplace drug and alcohol policy
as being inconsistent with just cause provisions in collective agreements38
and the sanction of proportionate disciplinary responses to breaches of
workplace drug and alcohol policies, including refusals by employees in
safety-sensitive positions to submit to reasonable cause drug or alcohol
testing.
39
Human rights legislation, and in particular the duty to accommodate,
impacts on workplace drug and alcohol testing. In doing so, it modifies the
interests to be balanced, but not the balancing of interests test. To appre-
ciate this distinction it is necessary to examine the general human rights
principles affecting the issue of workplace drug and alcohol testing before
turning to its application in the oil industry and, particularly, the offshore.
III. Impact of Human Rights Legislation Generally
1. Substance Abuse as Disability
Every jurisdiction in Canada has human rights legislation which
prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of physical or mental
disability.4 While each jurisdiction defines physical or mental disability
differently, the view reflected in recent jurisprudence is that dependency
37. Re Canadian National Railway Co. and United Transportation Union (1990), 11 L.A.C. (4th)
364 (Picher), wherein random drug testing was imposed for a period of three years following an
employee's positive test for marijuana use; Re City of Winnipeg and Canadian Union of Public Em-
ployees, Local 500 (1991), 23 L.A.C. (4th) 441 (Baizley et al.) [City of Winnipeg], wherein random
drug and alcohol testing for one year was upheld as a return to work condition following a suspension
for on-duty drug use; Re Lear Seating Canada Inc. and Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers
Union, Local 753 (1993), 33 L.A.C. (4th) 307 (Craven), wherein random drug and alcohol testing was
imposed as condition of reinstatement following termination for on-duty drug use.
38. Trimac, supra note 30.
39. Re CP Rail and Canadian Automobile Workers, Rail Division, Local 101 (1991), 22 L.A.C. (4th)
164 (Picher), in which a discharge was upheld due to both employee dishonesty and a refusal to submit
to drug testing on spurious grounds (i.e., unfounded concerns that test results could be tampered with);
Re National Gypsum (Canada) Ltd. and International Union of Operating Engineers, Locals 721 &
721B (1997), 67 L.A.C. (4th) 360 (MacKeigan) [National Gypsum], wherein it was held that disciplin-
ary action was permitted in response to an employee's refusal to submit to reasonable cause drug and
alcohol testing, provided that "reasonable cause" for requiring the employee to submit to a test existed
and that the basis for same was clearly communicated to the employee.
40. See generally Stacey Reginald Ball, Canadian Employment Law, vol. 2, looseleaf (Aurora, Ont.:
Canada Law Book Inc., 2003) at para. 33:60.
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on drugs4 or alcohol42 is a protected form of disability. Though only
Nova Scotia explicitly includes the "perception" of a disability within its
definition of disability,43 courts, arbitrators, and human rights tribunals in
other jurisdictions have interpreted human rights legislation to prohibit
discrimination in employment on the basis of a perceived disability." In
this regard, it should be emphasized that parties to a collective agree-
ment cannot contract out of the protections afforded by human rights
legislation. A necessary corollary of this rule is that any provisions in a
collective agreement purporting to abrogate the protections afforded by
the applicable human rights legislation are of no force and effect as con-
trary to public policy.46
2. Rights of Substance Dependent Individuals Under Human Rights
Legislation
a. Establishing Discrimination
If an employee has or is perceived to have a drug or alcohol dependency
problem, the issue then becomes whether, through testing or a response
to a test result, he or she has been discriminated against by the employer.
Although "discrimination" is by its nature contextual, the Supreme Court
of Canada has described it in the following terms:
What does discrimination mean? The question has arisen most commonly
in a consideration of the Human Rights Acts and the general concept of
discrimination under those enactments has been fairly well settled. There
is little difficulty, drawing upon the cases in the Court, in isolating an
acceptable definition ... I would say then that discrimination may be
41. See e.g. Canadian Civil Liberties Assn. v. Toronto Dominion Bank, 1998 CarswellNat 1352
(FC.A.) (eC) [Civil Liberties].
42. See e.g. Saskatchewan (Department of Finance) v. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission),
2002 CarswellSask 757 (Q.B.) (eC); Niles v. Canadian National Railway Company (1992), 94 D.L.R.
(4th) 33 (F.C.A.); Handfield v. Board of School Trustees, School District No. 26, (1995) 25 C.H.R.R.
D/452 (BCCHR); Williams v. Elty Publications Ltd. (1992), 20 C.H.R.R. D/52 (BCCHR).
43. Human Rights Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c.214, s.3(I). But see Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c.H-
19, s. 10 as am. by S.O. 2001, c.32, s.27(2). Consequent upon this amendment, the previous definition
of "handicap," which was interpreted to included "perceived" disabilities, was replaced with a defini-
tion of "disability" that makes no reference to perceived disabilities.
44. Canadian Employment Law, supra note 40 at para. 33:60.4; The Law of Human Rights in Can-
ada: Practice and Procedure, supra note 5 at para. 5.30.1; and see especially Newfoundland (Human
Rights Commission) v. Health Care Corporation of St. John s, 2003 CarswellNfld 54 (C.A.) (eQ.
45. Newfoundland (Green Bay Health Care Centre) v. N.A.P.E. (1996), 140 Nfld. & PE.I.R. 63
(s.c.C.).
46. Ibid.; see also Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Etobicoke (Borough), [1982] I S.C.R.
202.
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described as a distinction, whether intentional or not but based on grounds
relating to personal characteristics of the individual or group, which has
the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such in-
dividual or group not imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits
access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to other
members of society. Distinctions based on personal characteristics
attributed to an individual solely on the basis of association with a group
will rarely escape the charge of discrimination, while those based on an
individual's merits and capacities will rarely be so classed.47
The authorities are clear that the initial onus is on an employee to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination. This means that the employee must
point to facts which would support a finding of discrimination, described
above, on the basis of a disability. In this regard, all an employee need
establish is that the impugned conduct was to some degree based on the
employee's actual or perceived disability.48 Some examples of employer
responses to positive drug or alcohol test results that could be viewed as
potentially discriminatory include: imposition of random drug testing to
monitor drug use, imposition of random alcohol testing for employees
in non-safety-sensitive positions, discharge, suspension, reassignment
to non-safety sensitive duties (even without loss of pay or benefits) and
denial of promotion or transfer.
b. Employer Defences - Before and After Meiorin
If an employee fails to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, the
matter is at an end. However, if upon consideration of these threshold
issues, an employee makes out a prima facie case of discrimination, the
burden then shifts to the employer to defend the allegation and prove
that the allegedly discriminatory conduct was justified or was in fact not
discriminatory in a manner prohibited under human rights legislation.
As much of the human rights jurisprudence concerning workplace drug
and alcohol testing arose prior to the Supreme Court of Canada's decision
in British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission)
v. B.C.G.S.E.U. (Meiorin),49 it is useful to examine briefly the previous
approach to discrimination. Prior to Meiorin, the defences available to an
47. Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at 173-175; Gibbs v. Battl-
efords and District Co-operative Ltd., [1996] 3 S.C.R. 566 at para. 20.
48. The Law of Human Rights in Canada: Practice and Procedure, supra note 5 at paras. 15:10-15:
20.2.
49. [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 [Meiorin].
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employer charged with discrimination depended on whether the policy or
actions were classified as direct or adverse effect (indirect) discrimina-
tion. Direct discrimination occurred where a rule or practice specifically
targeted a group or class on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimina-
tion, whereas adverse effect discrimination arose where a rule of neutral
application imposed adverse consequences on such individuals. If the
policy or actions were found to be directly discriminatory, the employer
bore the onus of establishing that the policy or action constituted a bona
fide occupational requirement ("BFOR"), i.e., that the policy or action was
imposed honestly and in good faith (subjectively) and was reasonably
necessary to the performance of the work without placing undue burdens
on employees (objectively). If the employer failed to meet this burden,
the policy was struck down in its entirety, but if it succeeded, the policy
was upheld and no issues of accommodation arose. By contrast, if the
discriminatory policy fell into the adverse effect category, the employer
had to prove that the policy was imposed honestly and in good faith, that
it was reasonable insofar as it was rationally connected to job performance
and that the discriminatory effect of the policy could not be ameliorated
without undue hardship.5"
As a result of Meiorin, the distinction between direct and adverse
discrimination has become largely irrelevant. To determine whether a
discriminatory rule has a bona fide and reasonable justification, it must be
established under the following test:
(1) that the employer adopted the standard for a purpose rationally
connected to the performance of the job [objectively];
(2) that the employer adopted the particular standard in an honest and
good faith belief that it was necessary to the fulfillment of that legiti-
mate work-related purpose [subjectively]; and
(3) that the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of
that legitimate work-related purpose. To show that the standard is
reasonably necessary, it must be demonstrated that it is impossible
to accommodate individual employees sharing the characteristics of
the claimant without imposing undue hardship upon the employer
[objectively]."
50. Leading Cases on Labour Arbitrations, supra note 20 at 13-71-2.
51. Meiorin, supra note 49 at para. 54.
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Consequently even if an employer can establish that it had an objectively
rational reason to impose drug and alcohol testing and that it did so in
good faith, whether the testing infringes human rights legislation will
depend on whether, in the circumstances, the disadvantage imposed by the
rule can be alleviated by individual accommodation to the point of undue
hardship.
c. Accommodation and Undue Hardship
Accommodation to the point of undue hardship is always a question of fact
dependent on the circumstances of each case. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court of Canada has identified certain factors to be taken into account in
determining whether such accommodation is possible. In Central Alberta
Dairy Pool v. Alberta Human Rights Commission, Wilson J. held that:
I do not find it necessary to provide a comprehensive definition of what
constitutes undue hardship but I believe it may be helpful to list some of
the factors that may be relevant to such an appraisal. I begin by adopt-
ing those identified by the board of inquiry in the case at bar-financial
cost, disruption of a collective agreement, problems of morale of other
employees, interchangeability of work force and facilities. The size of the
employer's operation may influence the assessment of whether a given
financial cost is undue or the ease with which the work force and facili-
ties can be adapted to the circumstances. Where safety is at issue both the
magnitude of the risk and the identity of those who bear it are relevant
considerations. This list is not intended to be exhaustive and the results
which will obtain from a balancing of these factors against the right of the
employee to be free from discrimination will necessarily vary from case
to case.
52
As a general rule, undue hardship means something more than a negligible
effect or inconvenience. "Undue hardship" has been interpreted to mean
that a considerable degree of hardship can be required in the accommoda-
tive process. 53 Notably, both the Canadian Human Rights Commission and
the Ontario Human Rights Commission have indicated that an employer
will meet the test for undue hardship if it can show that either the cost
of accommodation would alter the nature or affect the viability of the
enterprise, or that notwithstanding accommodative efforts, health or safety
risks to workers or members of the public are so serious that they outweigh
52. 1990 CarswellAita 149 at para. 74 (S.C.C.) (eC) [Central Alberta Dairy Pool].
53. Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud (1992), 95 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (S.C.C.).
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the benefits of providing individualized accommodation or consideration
to a worker with an addiction or dependency problem.
54
IV. Leading Human Rights Jurisprudence on Workplace Drug and
Alcohol Policies
The most significant decision preceding the Ontario Court of Appeal's
ruling in Entrop is that of the Federal Court of Appeal in Canadian Civil
Liberties Assn. v. Toronto Dominion Bank (Civil Liberties).5" In that case,
a bank introduced a universal drug and alcohol policy, mandatory for
lower level employees, requiring drug and alcohol testing through urinaly-
sis. The purpose of the policy was to facilitate a safe, healthy, and produc-
tive workplace, safeguard funds and confidential banking information, and
protect the bank's reputation in the community. Employees who tested
positive were required to attend treatment and rehabilitation counseling at
the employer's expense, with the provision that if rehabilitation failed or
was refused by the employee, termination would follow.
The crux of the Court's decision turned on the fact that the policy
at issue, treating casual drug and alcohol users the same as dependent
users, linked loss of employment with drug or alcohol use. Consequently,
as drug and alcohol dependencies were accepted as protected disabilities,
the effect of the policy was prima facie discriminatory against substance-
dependent employees. The Court rejected the notion that only an individ-
ual's failure to comply with the policy would result in loss of employment
and held that provision of accommodation cannot save an otherwise
discriminatory rule that is unreasonable. Drug and alcohol testing through
urinalysis could not be shown to be rationally connected to the objective
of ensuring the efficient, safe, and honest performance of the non-safety-
sensitive duties performed by those subjected to testing.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Civil Liberties does stand for the
proposition that drug testing is acceptable in certain circumstances. As
noted by Macdonald J.A.:
54. Ontario Human Rights Commission, Policy on Drug and Alcohol Testing, (5 August 2002), on-
line: Ontario Human Rights Commission <http:www.ohrc.on.ca/English/publications/drug-alcohol-
policy.shtml>; Canadian Human Rights Commission, Policy on Drug and Alcohol Testing (10 July
2002), online: Canadian Human Rights Commission <http:www.chrc-ccdp.ca/legislation-policies/al-
cohol-drug-testing-en.asp>.
55. Civil Liberties, supra note 41.
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If, however, an employee exhibits poor performance and the Bank be-
lieves it may be related to a drug dependency, then (and only then) should
the Bank be able to test the employee and, if necessary, send the employee
to some form of rehabilitation or counseling program. To comply with
the reasonable accommodation component an employee cannot be tested
unless after receiving treatment his or her work performance remains
inadequate. Thus, if after receiving treatment, the employee's work
performance is fine, no further tests should be undertaken. If after re-
ceiving treatment the employee's performance continues to remain inad-
equate, the Bank is justified in re-testing and dismissing the employee
if the poor performance is related to drugs. The Bank need not send the
employee out for further treatment.
56
Civil Liberties set the stage for Entrop, which remains the most influential
decision on the issue of workplace drug and alcohol testing. The plaintiff
in that case, Mr. Martin Entrop, was employed at Imperial Oil's Sarnia
Refinery from the mid-1970s, and from 1987 held the position of senior
control board operator responsible for controlling several oil refining
processes. In 1991, Imperial Oil introduced its new drug and alcohol
policy. Under the policy, safety-sensitive positions were identified as
those which "have a key and direct role in an operation where impaired
performance could result in a catastrophic incident affecting the health or
safety of employees, sales associates, contractors, customers, the public or
the environment." Given Mr. Entrop's duties, his position was classified
as safety-sensitive.
As required by the policy, Mr. Entrop disclosed that he had previ-
ously been an alcoholic, but also that he had not had a drink since 1984.
Nevertheless, on receipt of this information, Imperial Oil reassigned Mr.
Entrop to a non-safety-sensitive position at the same rate of pay, which led
to his filing a complaint with the Ontario Human Rights Commission. By
the time the case worked its way to the Court of Appeal, the issues to be
determined related to whether the provisions of the policy applicable to
Mr. Entrop infringed the Ontario Human Rights Code (the "Code"). In that
regard, it should be emphasized that only the aspects of the policy dealing
with alcohol testing and the consequences were properly before the Court
of Appeal. Therefore, other aspects of the decision dealing with drug test-
ing are obiter. As will be shown, however, the decision has persuasive
56. Civil Liberties, supra note 41 at para. 38 [emphasis in original]. However, the Federal Court of
Appeal did note that the ability to impose workplace drug testing may differ for employees in safety-
sensitive operations.
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force and is indicative of the way in which similar issues will likely be
dealt with by other courts.
As a starting premise, it was accepted that drug or alcohol dependency
was a protected handicap or disability under Ontario human rights legis-
lation. The policy imposed sanctions ranging from a refusal to hire a job
applicant to discipline up to and including dismissal for anyone testing
positive for drugs or alcohol. Employees in safety-sensitive positions
were subject to automatic dismissal following a positive drug or alcohol
test. As casual drug and alcohol users were subject to the same penalties
as substance abusers under the policy, and because "perceived disability"
is protected under the Code, anyone testing positive was entitled to the
protection of the Code. In other words, the policy treated anyone who
tested positive as a "perceived" substance abuser because it was assumed,
as reflected by the penalties imposed, that anyone testing positive would
likely be impaired at work presently or in the future. A prima facie case of
discrimination was thus established and the onus shifted to the employer
to defend the policy.57
In assessing the employer's defence, the Court of Appeal applied the
Meiorin test to determine the compliance of the policy with the Code. In
applying the first part of the test, Laskin J.A. noted that the focus of this
part of the test is not on the validity of the rule, but its general purpose
(i.e., whether the rule was adopted for a purpose rationally connected to
the performance of the job). Insofar as "an accident at a refinery can have
catastrophic results for employees, the public and the environment," the
purpose of the policy, being to "'minimize the risk of impaired perfor-
mance due to substance use' in order 'to ensure a safe, healthy and produc-
tive workplace,"' 5 8 satisfied the first part of the test. Similarly, the Court
held the second part of the test was satisfied in that Imperial Oil intro-
duced the policy honestly and in good faith as shown by the fact that it had
consulted widely with both its employees and experts in the field of
substance abuse.59 The crux of the decision relates to the application of
the third part of the Meiorin test and whether the provisions of the policy
were reasonably necessary to accomplish Imperial Oil's purpose, Imperial
Oil could provide individualized accommodation without suffering undue
hardship. Generally, Laskin J.A. noted that:
57. Supra note 4 at 17-18.
58. Supra note 4 at para. 94.
59. Supra note 4 at paras. 18-19.
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An employer's workplace rule may fail to satisfy the third step in the
Meiorin test in several ways. For example the rule may be arbitrary in the
sense that it is not linked to or does not further the employer's legitimate
purpose; the rule may be too broad or stricter than reasonably necessary
to achieve the employer's purpose; the rule may unreasonably not provide
for individual assessment; or the rule may not be reasonably necessary
because other means, less intrusive of individual human rights, are avail-
able to achieve the employer's purpose.
60
The Court of Appeal found that the provisions of the policy concern-
ing both random and pre-employment drug testing infringed the Code.
Although urinalysis can show the presence of drug metabolites, indicating
past drug use, it cannot measure present impairment vis-ti-vis an individu-
al's ability to perform his or her job safely. As a positive drug test cannot
provide evidence of impairment or the likelihood of future impairment,
it was found not to be reasonably necessary to the fulfilment of Impe-
rial Oil's purpose. Further, the automatic termination of safety-sensitive
employees for a positive drug test was too severe in that dismissal exceed-
ed what was reasonably necessary to ensure a safe workplace and preclud-
ed accommodation. It was held that pre-employment drug testing suffered
from the same two flaws and was likewise contrary to the Code.6
The provisions of the policy dealing with random alcohol testing were,
however, another matter. The Court of Appeal set aside the Board's ruling
by holding that random alcohol testing of employees in safety-sensitive
positions is permitted by the Code as long as individualized accommoda-
tion is provided to employees who test positive. Unlike urinalysis, breath-
alyser testing can show present impairment and is therefore a reasonable
means of preventing workplace impairment.62 The 0.4 percent blood-
alcohol standard was accepted given expert evidence indicating that most
individuals show discernible signs of impairment at that level of intoxica-
tion.63 As to the issue of accommodation, Laskin J.A. held the impugned
policy would necessarily include sanctions less severe than termination
60. Supra note 4 at para. 97.
61. Supra note 4 at paras. 99-105.
62. The Court's rationale suggests that whether or not random testing is permitted depends on the
capacity of the test being administered to show present impairment. Under this reasoning, if and when
drug testing technology develops to the point that such tests can determine if a person is presently im-
paired by drug use, random drug testing would be permitted of employees in safety-sensitive positions.
Employers would therefore be well-advised to stay abreast of developing drug testing technologies.
63. Compare Dupont, supra note 18 at 434. In that case, the Board accepted that a post-rehabilitation
or post-policy breach testing regime where zero consumption is considered to be a condition of the
reinstatement permits a ratio of 0.02 blood alcohol.
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and, where appropriate, provision of employee support through facilita-
tion of treatment or rehabilitative programs. 64
The sections of the policy authorizing post-incident, post-accident,
and near-miss drug and alcohol testing were upheld as consistent with
the Code. However, as only alcohol testing can show present impairment,
drug testing in these situations is permitted only as a necessary "facet of a
larger assessment of drug abuse."65
The mandatory disclosure provisions of the policy were found to be
reasonable, but only to a point. It would be unreasonable to require an
employee to disclose a previous substance abuse problem in respect of
which the risk of recurrence is no greater than that of a member of the
general public of developing a dependency problem. That being the case,
and based upon the expert evidence before the Court of Appeal, manda-
tory disclosure of past dependency problems is permitted by the Code if
limited to substance abuse problems suffered within five to six years of
successful remission for drug dependency and six years for alcohol de-
pendency.66 Similarly, mandatory automatic reassignment of employees
following disclosure of a past substance abuse problem was found to
violate the Code for the same reasons. However, temporary reassignment
to non-safety-sensitive duties may be permitted where an employee has a
current or recently active dependency problem.
Not surprisingly, in light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeal found
the policy provisions requiring two years' rehabilitation followed by
five years' abstinence to be unreasonable and overly broad, since such
a lengthy period would not be necessary in all cases. The corollary of
this finding noted by Laskin J.A. is that universal boilerplate conditions
on reinstatement are similarly unreasonable since such conditions are not
necessary in all cases and should reflect individualized accommodation
appropriate to each situation.67
64. Supra note 4 at paras. 106-112.
65. Supra note 4 at para. 114. But see Ontario Human Rights Commission, Policy on Drug and
Alcohol Testing, supra note 54 at 6. Though neither the Board nor the Court of Appeal elaborated
on what a "larger assessment of drug abuse" entails in this context, the Ontario Human Rights Com-
mission suggests that "this larger assessment could include a broader medical assessment under a
physician's care where there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is underlying problem of
substance abuse. Additional components of a larger assessment may include employee assistance
programs, peer reviews and supervisory reviews."
66. The actual period of time during which a person with a previous substance abuse problem is at a
greater risk of suffering a recurrence than a member of the public is of developing a substance abuse
problem is a question of fact dependent on expert evidence. Therefore, if similar policy provisions in
other cases are subject to judicial challenge, the applicable period of time for reporting prior drug or
alcohol dependency problems could vary from those accepted by the Court of Appeal.
67. Supra note 4 at para. 124.
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Interestingly, the sections of the policy requiring drug and alcohol
testing as a component of certification prior to promotion or transfer into
a safety-sensitive position were upheld.6 Taken with the prohibition on
pre-employment drug and alcohol testing, it appears that an employer, as
part of an overall certification process, can require incumbents of safety-
sensitive positions to submit to drug and alcohol testing, provided that
individualized accommodation is given to individuals who test positive.
While Entrop has attracted considerable academic comment, 69 the
case has received surprisingly little judicial treatment outside the arbitral
context in connection with workplace drug and alcohol testing. Never-
theless, one recent authority suggests that courts will apply the obiter
comments in Entrop concerning drug testing.
Alberta (Human Rights & Citizenship Commission) v. Elizabeth Metis
Settlement7 provides some guidance on the likely treatment of Entrop by
other courts in connection with drug and alcohol testing. In that case, the
employer implemented a drug and alcohol testing policy in response to
a documented workplace substance abuse problem. The policy required
inter alia mandatory universal random drug testing, and the case arose
following the dismissal of two municipal administrative employees for
refusing to undergo drug and alcohol testing. The court adopted the rea-
sons set forth in Entrop and found that the mandatory universal random
drug testing provisions of the policy were prima facie discriminatory in
that adverse consequences followed in the event that employees tested
positive.71 Nevertheless, given the cloistered nature of the community
and the exalted position of municipal employees therein, in applying the
Meiorin test, the court found that employees remaining substantially free
from drug and alcohol use was a bona fide occupational requirement and
upheld the policy on the basis that the employees were to serve as role
models for a community suffering from widespread substance abuse
problems. An appeal of this decision has been filed, but has not been
adjudicated.72
68. Supra note 4 at paras. 128-9.
69. See e.g. Canadian Employment Law, supra note 40 at para. 33:60.4; The Law of Human Rights in
Canada: Practice and Procedure, supra note 5 at para. 5.30. 1; Brian Johnston & Tara Erskine, "Test-
ing the Limits: Alcohol & Drug Testing for Offshore Employees" 24 Dal. L.J. 316.
70. 2003 CarswellAlta 570 (Q.B.) (eC) [Elizabeth Metis Settlement].
7 1. Ibid. at paras, 20-41.
72. In the authors' respectful view, it appears that the court in the Elizabeth Metis Settlement may
have misapplied the third branch of the Meiorin test by failing to consider whether accommodation
was possible, i.e., by assuming that the issue of accommodation did not arise once it has been estab-
lished that the discriminatory conduct is rationally connected to the fulfillment of a legitimate busi-
ness-related objective of the employer.
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As held in Entrop, whether or not the effect of a drug and alcohol test-
ing policy constitutes direct or indirect discrimination is largely irrelevant
in light of Meiorin. Nevertheless, under both the previous jurisprudence
and the three-part Meiorin test, in order for any prima facie discriminatory
policy to be upheld, it must be reasonable. In this context, the reasonable-
ness requirement means that the imposition of drug and alcohol testing
must be rationally and necessarily connected to a legitimate business
interest. As noted by several recent authorities, assessing the reasonable-
ness of a workplace drug and alcohol testing policy under the Meiorin test
requires the same balancing of interests test applied under the KVP
criteria.73 Arbitral jurisprudence can therefore be particularly helpful in
delineating some of the finer points to be considered in developing and
administering a workplace drug and alcohol policy.
V. Emerging Trends of Apparent Judicial Consistency
1. Considerations in Developing Drug and Alcohol Policies
a. Union Involvement in Development and Administration of Drug and
Alcohol Policies
Employers are not under a positive obligation to involve unions in the
development or implementation of drug and alcohol policies as such
authority is within the purview of management rights and thus subject
only to the KVP guidelines.74 However, this is not to suggest that there are
no advantages to involving unions at the development stage, or that unions
have no role to play in administering drug and alcohol policies.
In situations where a union has been voluntarily consulted by the
employer and involved in the development of a drug and alcohol policy
to which it later consents, the focus of any subsequent challenge to tests
imposed in accordance with the policy is distinct from situations such as
the KVP case in which testing is required under a unilaterally imposed
policy. This is exemplified by the Boards' decisions in Re Fluor Construc-
tors Canada Ltd. and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Local 424"5 and Re Construction Labour Relations and United Broth-
73. Metropol, supra note 33 at 408; Trimac, supra note 30 at 277-79; Canadian National, 2000,
supra note 16 at 386-7; Dupont, supra note 18 at 419-422.
74. Dupont, supra note 18 at 413-414. The Board in Dupont rejected the argument that the union,
as exclusive bargaining agent, ought to have been involved in negotiating the terms of the drug and
alcohol policy as same represent terms and conditions of employment.
75. (2001), 100 L.A.C. (4th) 391 (Elliott) [Fluor].
614 The Dalhousie Law Journal
erhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Locals 1325 and 2103
(Construction Labour Relations).76 In each case, the Board dismissed
allegations of discriminatory testing because the union, as the employees'
exclusive bargaining agent, had been consulted and agreed to the terms
of the policy at issue (i.e., the arbitrator's role was to apply the terms of
the policy as agreed between the parties). While the reasoning in each
case is sparse on the point, it appears that the Boards' rulings, following a
thorough review of jurisprudence, were predicated on their findings that
the agreed-upon policy at issue in each instance was compliant with hu-
man rights legislation and in conformity with the rationale in Entrop.
As all human rights legislation imposes reciprocal tripartite duties
on employers, employees, and unions vis-ii-vis accommodative respon-
sibilities,7 7 arbitrators require union involvement in return-to-work,
reinstatement or after-care agreements governing the ongoing terms of
employment following an employee's breach of a drug and alcohol policy.
However, implicit in the statutorily imposed duty to accommodate is a
requirement that unions not unreasonably withhold their consent to after-
care, return-to-work or reinstatement conditions, including, where neces-
sary, the imposition of random drug and alcohol testing.78
b. Extrinsic Factors Justifying Imposition of Workplace Drug and Alcohol
Policy
Insofar as offshore oil rigs and platforms are inherently safety-sensitive
work areas, it is highly unlikely that further support would be necessary
to justify the proactive imposition of a drug and alcohol policy to manage
the risk of workplace impairment.79 Under the second branch of the KVP
criteria, this principle has been expressed to mean that the test of justi-
fication, or adequate cause, is met where management can show either
evidence of a substance abuse problem in the workplace or reasonable
grounds for concern given the severity of potential consequences to
persons, property, or the environment in the event of a workplace
accident.8 0
76. (2001), 96 L.A.C. (4th) 343 (Beattie et al.) [Construction Labour Relations].
77. See e.g. Canadian Human Rights Act, infra note 119 ss. 10, 25; Human Rights Code, infra note
120 ss. 9, 2(k)(n); Human Rights Act, infra note 121 ss. 5, 3(k); see also Irving, infra note 84 at 342;
Dupont, supra note 18 at 427-428.
78. Irving, ibid. at 342.
79. Canadian National, 2000, supra note 16.
80. Continental Lime, supra note 32 at 284.
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To facilitate a broad purposive approach to determining whether the
imposition of workplace drug and alcohol testing is justifiable, the Board
in Re Continental Lime Ltd. and International Brotherhood of Boilermak-
ers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, Local D575
(Continental Lime) considered, inter alia the statutory obligations and
liabilities of the employer. In that case, provisions enacted under the
applicable occupational health and safety legislation imposed a duty on
the employer to take steps to prevent the impairment of employees through
drug or alcohol use, a duty which was found to justify the imposition of a
workplace drug and alcohol testing policy.8'
Though the legislatively mandated duties on employers in the Atlantic
offshore oil industry are less explicit than those at issue in Continental
Lime,82 under the current occupational health and safety regime,83 em-
ployers are required to take all reasonable steps necessary to ensure that
employees work free from any impairment that could create a risk of injury
to themselves or others. In the authors' view, this obligation is binding on
both employers and employees and lends further support to the imposition
of workplace drug and alcohol testing as a means of ensuring workplace
safety in the Atlantic offshore.
81. Continental Lime, supra note 32 at 282-283; see also Canadian National, 2000, supra note 16 at
376-378.
82. At issue was Man. Reg. 228/94, s. 3 1. This statutory requirement, considered by the Board
in Continental Lime, explicitly provides that an employer shall take all reasonable steps to prevent
a worker from: "bringing alcoholic beverages or drugs to a mine, consuming or keeping alcoholic
beverages or drugs at a mine.., and working in or about a mine while under the influence of alcohol
or under the influence of a drug that impairs or could impair the worker's ability to work safely."
Compare Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c.O-3, ss. 4, 5; Occupational Health
and Safety Regulations, Nfld. Reg. 1165/96, s. 27; Occupational Health and Safety Act, S.N.S. 1996,
c. 7, ss. 13, 17, 28. See also Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Drilling Regulations, S.O.R./93-23, s.
136; Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Drilling Regulations, S.O.R./ 92-676, s. 136; Petroleum Occu-
pational Health and Safety Regulations - Newfoundland, Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum
Board <http://www.cnopb.nfnet.com> (last modified: July 29, 2003), s. 17, enforced pursuant to s.
138, Newfoundland Accord Act, infra note 123; Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Occupational Health
& Safety Requirements, Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board <http://www.cnsopb.ns.ca/
Healthsafety/ healthsafety. html> (last modified: June 30, 2003), s. 17. Though the aforementioned
regulatory provisions require that employers in the offshore maintain a safe workplace and concomi-
tantly that employees work free from impairment, there are as yet no regulatory provisions in the
offshore requiring employers to take active measures to ensure that employees comply with this
obligation.
83. Newfoundland Accord Act, infra note 122 at s. 152; Nova Scotia Accord Act, infra note 123 at
s. 157. Under the Accord Acts, provincial occupational health and safety legislation applies in the
offshore as respectively Newfoundland and Nova Scotia "social legislation."
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2. Interpretation and Application of Drug and Alcohol Policies
a. Who can be tested? Safety-sensitive vs. Non-safety-sensitive Positions
Most authorities restrict drug and alcohol testing to incumbents of, or
successful applicants for, safety-sensitive positions. Whether or not a
particular position is safety-sensitive is necessarily a question of fact in all
the circumstances. Simply classifying a position as safety sensitive does
not automatically make it so, and there must be a factual basis for any
such designation. 4 In that regard, recent authorities provide support for
concluding that all positions on an offshore oil rig or platform are inher-
ently safety-sensitive.
Two recent authorities are of particular relevance in addressing this
issue: Re J.D. Irving Ltd. and Communication, Energy and Paperwork-
ers' Union, Locals 104 and 1309 (Irving)85 and Re Dupont Canada Inc.
and CEP, Local 28-0 (Dupont).86 The drug and alcohol policy in Irving
defined "safety-sensitive position" without reference to the degree of su-
pervision to which such positions are subject. The union argued, based on
Entrop, that in order for a position to be correctly designated as "safety-
sensitive," it had to be one in which there was little or no direct supervi-
sion. The Board resoundingly rejected this argument and held that:
Bearing in mind that the impairment of an individual by drugs or alcohol is
not always readily apparent and detectable, from a purposive standpoint,
direct oversight, whether constant or occasional, by a supervisor does not
change the safety-sensitive nature of the work being performed....
In our view for the purposes of drug and alcohol testing the identification
of safety-sensitive positions is more usefully achieved by asking what
consequences are risked if the person performing a particular kind of
work does so impaired by drugs or alcohol....
In any industrial enterprise, a policy as important as the drug and alcohol
policy under consideration in this case must have clear parameters of ap-
plication. Whether a particular task is qualified as safety sensitive cannot,
in our view, be made to depend on the number of supervisors on duty,
much less on such unpredictable factors as whether a supervisor is called
away to a meeting, or to deal with a problem elsewhere in the plant at
any given point in time. It is the work of the employee, the nature of the
84. Re Osberg and Westcan Bulk Transport Limited, [2001] C.L.A.D. No. 122 (QL); Continental
Lime, supra note 32 at 265.
85. (2002), 111 L.A.C. (4th) 328 (Picher et al.) [Irving].
86. Supra note 18.
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equipment that he or she operates and the nature of the material he or she
handles which must be at the core of the determination of whether his or
her position is safety sensitive.
87
The Board in Dupont found that the risks attendant upon the performance
of an employee's duties can be as much a function of the materials and
equipment to which he or she is exposed as the nature of the duties them-
selves. The evidence before the Board showed that the chemical plant
employees routinely rotated through safety and non-safety-sensitive
positions and that all employees had access to potentially dangerous
equipment and materials. Consequently, all employees were held to
occupy safety-sensitive positions.8"
In the authors' view, the principles established in Irving and Dupont
are unassailable and applicable to employees of offshore oil rigs and
production platforms. Considering the difficulty of detecting workplace
impairment, particularly drug use, coupled with the competing demands
on supervisors, it is evident that restricting drug and alcohol testing to
employees working with little or no supervision would render impossible
any meaningful attempt to manage the risk of workplace impairment. All
employees in the offshore, from cooks to drilling crews, perform duties,
access and utilize equipment and materials that could, if misused, place
themselves, others and the environment at serious risk. This threat of
imminent danger is in fact one of the defining qualities of employment in
the offshore. Thus, segregating employees into safety or non-safety-sensi-
tive designations would be a theoretical exercise representing the antith-
esis of risk management as those working on an oil rig or platform are in
the same position as employees in a chemical plant insofar as "the safety
of all can hinge on the wellness of one." 89
b. Drug Testing: Reasonable Cause, Post-Accident and Near-Miss
As with the administration of any workplace rule, policy or agreement,
the starting point must be the language of the policy itself. In most cases,
employers in risk-sensitive industries can be expected to structure drug
and alcohol policies in accordance with Entrop principles.' Consequently,
87. Irving, supra note 85 at 337-338.
88. Dupont, supra note 18 at 415-417.
89. Dupont, supra note 18 at 416.
90. It can therefore be anticipated that many drug and alcohol policies will allow random alcohol
tests to be administered, by breathalyser, to employees in safety-sensitive positions.
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most drug and alcohol policies will ordinarily provide for drug testing
where there is reasonable cause to suspect impairment. "Reasonable
cause" 91 has been interpreted to mean that, at a minimum, the risk of im-
pairment from drug use, objectively assessed, exceeds the risk of impair-
ment from minor medical problems (e.g., colds, allergies and headaches)
that go largely unnoticed, even in risk-sensitive industries. 92 This interpre-
tation makes sense, since reasonable cause drug testing would otherwise
be indistinguishable from random drug testing.
Although detecting impairment from drug use is a difficult exercise,
this dilemma does not alter the reasonable cause threshold employers must
meet before an employee can be required to undergo a drug test.93 The
issue is one of detection and in that regard, Re Tembec Inc. and Industrial
Wood and Allied Workers of Canada, Local 1-1000 94 is a useful authority.
In that case, the Board considered the imposition of discipline following
the refusal by two employees to submit to drug testing in circumstances
where they were observed by three supervisors as "talking loud" and
"agitated." The employees appeared "tired looking" and were observed to
have "red eyes" and dilated pupils. The policy at issue did not provide ex-
amples of the signs of impairment that give rise to a reasonable suspicion,
but the Board held that they would likely include, but not be limited to:
abnormal or exaggerated gait;
alcohol smell on breath;
excessive coloration, pale or ruddy;
abnormal (e.g., slurred or stilted) speech;
exaggerated gestures;
avoidance of eye contact when speaking;
dilated pupils;
unexplained agitation; and
shaking of, for example, arms or shoulders.
95
Employers must be cautious in basing their assessment of reasonable cause
solely on the reported observations of a single employee. In National
Gypsum,96 it was held that a claim by a co-worker to have smelt marijuana
91. Supra notes 21 and 23 and accompanying test. Cultivation of illicit drugs or admission of re-
peated drug use by employees have been found to constitute reasonable cause to require drug testing.
92. Trimac, supra note 30 at 272-275.
93. See e.g. National Gypsum, supra note 39 at 374.
94. [1999] O.L.A. No. 85 (Murray) (QL).
95. Ibid. at para. 18.
96. Supra note 39.
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in the vicinity of another employee, absent any objective indications of
impairment, was insufficient to require a drug test under a policy that
permitted drug testing "when there are reasonable grounds to suspect
impairment." Similarly, the Board in Re C.H. Heist Ltd. and E.C.W.U.
Local 848 (Heist)97 held that in order for a co-worker's allegation to have
detected the scent of marijuana on another employee to give rise to a
reasonable suspicion of drug use, there had to be objectively verifiable
evidence (e.g., signs of smoke, butts or matches proximate to an
employee) linking the employee to suspected drug use. 98
Although it is impossible to enumerate every potential sign of
impairment, employers would be well-advised to include some examples
of objective indicia of impairment in drug and alcohol policies to better
enable employees to recognize, record, and report suspicious behaviour.
Similarly, the obligation on employees to disclose to supervisors the iden-
tity of anyone exhibiting signs of impairment ought to be included in any
workplace drug and alcohol policy.
As with reasonable cause testing, whether a drug test can be required
after an accident, incident or near miss will depend on both the facts
of a given case and the wording of the policy at issue. Some guidance,
however, is provided by the Board's decision in Construction Labour
Relations, which addressed the legitimacy of requiring an employee
to submit to a drug test following an accident in which a minor injury
resulted that required medical attention. 99 Although the injured employee
showed no objective signs of impairment at the time of the accident, he
was unable to explain how the accident occurred. The policy at issue
permitted drug testing where an employee was "involved in an accident,
near miss, or other potentially dangerous incident," though "potentially
dangerous" was not defined. The Board held that the policy permitted the
employer to require an employee to undergo a drug test following any
accident that results in an injury requiring medical attention (i.e., any
injury requiring more than routine first aid). The Board's ruling in
97. Supra note 31.
98. But see Canadian National, 2000, supra note 16 at 377: "Suppose, for example, that a supervisor
enters a warehouse where four individuals are working. The smell of marijuana is clearly detectable
and an extinguished "roach" is found. All four employees deny any use of the drug while at work. If,
the following day, or perhaps even the following week, each of the employees concerned takes a drug
test by urinalysis, and one produces a positive result, the combination of circumstantial evidence, in-
cluding the odour, the finding of a discarded "roach", and the positive drug test of only one of the four
employees would, at a minimum, constitute a factual basis upon which meaningful inferences could
be drawn, on the civil standard of the balance of probabilities."
99. Supra note 76.
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Construction Labour Relations suggests that an employee could be
subject to drug testing where he or she narrowly escapes injury that would
doubtless have resulted in injuries requiring medical attention.
c. Alcohol and Drug Related Searches"°
As a general rule, employers have no absolute right to search the person
or personal effects of employees. This flows from a recognition of the
intrinsic value of an individual's right to privacy. However, several excep-
tions to the general rule have evolved in an attempt to balance employee
privacy rights with an employer's need to effectively and safely
manage the workplace. 1°a An employer, in furtherance of an investigation
undertaken pursuant to a substance abuse policy, has some latitude for
the conduct of searches. This is, of course, reasonable to the extent that
a policy aimed at preventing workplace impairment would be incomplete
if it did not also provide some means to detect the presence of impair-
ing substances on employer property. The judicial approach to this issue
recognizes workplace searches and drug and alcohol testing as moieties
and thus subject to the same concerns regarding the balancing of employee
privacy with the prevention of workplace impairment.
Random searches of employees and their possessions aimed at
uncovering drugs or alcohol on employer premises have been consistently
found to be unreasonable and hence unenforceable. Searches cannot be
speculative, abusive or arbitrarily undertaken,'02 particularly insofar as the
discovery of prohibited substances can give rise to a reasonable cause to
require an employee to undergo a drug or alcohol test.' 03 Otherwise, search
powers could be used to circumvent the limits imposed on an employer's
ability to test its employees for drug or alcohol use. As a result, searches
pursuant to workplace drug and alcohol policies are permitted to the
extent that these searches are based upon reasonable cause to suspect the
presence of alcohol, drugs or drug paraphernalia in the specific location, or
on the particular individual, to be searched. 104
100. Irving, supra note 85 at 343-344. Contrary to the popular belief held by many employees, police
assistance in conducting workplace searches, while often helpful, is not a "strict legal requirement."
101. Re Algoma Steel Corporation Ltd. And United Steelworkers, Local 2251 (1984), 17 L.A.C. (3d)
172 at 177-178 (Davis et al.); Re Glenbow-Alberta Institute and Canadian Union of Public Employ-
ees, Local 1645 (1988), 3 L.A.C. (4th) 127 at 144 (Beattie); Re British Columbia Railway Co. and
Canadian Union of Transportation Employees, Local 6 (1987), 29 L.A.C. (3d) 353 at 367-368 (Hope);
see generally Canadian Labour Arbitration, supra note 6 at paras. 7:3560, 7:3625.
102. Canadian National, 2000, supra note 16 at 398; Esso, supra note 29 at paras. 250-253.
103. Supra note 23 and accompanying text.
104. Canadian National, 2000, supra note 16 at 398; Esso, supra note 29 at paras. 250-253; Irving,
supra note 85 at 343-344; Dupont, supra note 18 at 434-435.
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As in the case of assessing whether there are reasonable grounds to
require an employee to undergo a drug or alcohol test, reasonable grounds
to search employees or their possessions must be based on objectively
verifiable indicia suggesting the presence of prohibited substances on em-
ployer property. A search may also be conducted (as part of an employ-
er's overall investigation) if there are reasonable grounds to suspect an
employee is presently impaired.'10
Workplace searches are somewhat more complicated in the Atlantic
offshore oil industry in that platform and oil rig employees live on-site for
weeks at a time. Although there are no reported cases directly on point,
based on established principles, searches of an employee's living quarters
would only be permitted if based upon clear evidence giving rise to a
reasonable suspicion that prohibited substances will be found. 
06
d. Addressing the Results of Drug & Alcohol Testing - Discipline or
Disability?
As reflected by the preponderance of jurisprudence canvassed thus far,
employers can reasonably expect that the most contentious issues likely to
arise in the course of administering a workplace drug and alcohol policy
will relate to the consequences imposed on employees for a policy viola-
tion, particularly when there are issues of disability due to alcohol or drug
dependancy involved.
The prepotency of Entrop as reflected in subsequent jurisprudence has
established that workplace drug and alcohol policies must allow for both
a disciplinary and non-disciplinary response to violations, depending on
whether the impugned behaviour is culpable or non-culpable.'0 7 In either
case, an employer's response must be individually tailored to the employee
relative to his or her personal circumstances vis-ti-vis the specific infrac-
tion. In land-based industries, policies that impose automatic termination
or other such blanket responses to specific infractions, culpable or other-
wise, are likely to be struck down and rendered void and unenforceable,'08
105. Canadian National, 2000, supra note 16 at 398: Esso, supra note 29 at paras. 250-253; Irving,
supra note 85 at 343-344.
106. There can be little doubt that oil rig and platform employees have a lesser expectation of privacy
in their on-site living quarters than that which they would have in their own homes in that their living
quarters are routinely shared and occupied by other employees during non-working periods.
107. Supra note 62 and accompanying text; Irving, supra note 85; Canadian National, 2000, supra
note 16 ; Trimac, supra note 30 ; Dupont, supra note 18; Esso, supra note 29.
108. See e.g. Canadian Labour Arbitration, supra note 6 at paras. 7:1100, 7:1200, 7:300, 7:4000;
Dupont, supra note 18 at 421-424.
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particularly if there is a clause in an applicable collective agreement
providing that no discipline will be imposed without "just cause."
Generally, absent issues relating to disability, the greater the degree of
on-duty impairment from drugs or alcohol, the more serious the employee's
misconduct and more severe the disciplinary response warranted. There is
no doubt that in appropriate circumstances, and particularly with respect
to serious policy violations by employees in safety-sensitive positions,
termination may be an appropriate response. Statements in workplace
drug and alcohol policies to the effect that discipline or even termina-
tion may result from certain prohibited conduct are a perfectly acceptable
"form of warning to employees that in the eyes of the employer certain
forms of offence are ... so serious as to possibly justify the termination of
an employee regardless of his or her prior record."' 9
With respect to the possession, use or distribution of a banned sub-
stance on company property or during working hours, such conduct is per
se justification for disciplinary action proportionate to the offence. 0
A breathalyzer test which shows an employee was impaired while
on-duty may serve as the basis for imposition of a proportionate disciplin-
ary response, subject to issues regarding disability. However, an employee
testing positive for drug use cannot be disciplined on that basis alone as
such tests cannot show present impairment. Nevertheless, a positive drug
test result coupled with independent evidence of workplace impairment is
material evidence in support of a finding of misconduct.'
Issues of accommodation under human rights legislation do not arise
until an employee is found or perceived to be disabled due to a substance
109. Irving, supra note 85 at 346.
110. See e.g. Middlemiss v. Norske Canada Ltd., 2002 CarswellBC 2014 (B.C.H.R.T.) (eC) [Mid-
dlemiss]. In that case, a human rights tribunal ruled that the refusal to continue the employment of a
stevedore caught smoking marijuana at the employer's premises during working hours, given that the
employee did not claim to have a substance abuse problem, did not constitute discrimination. The
employer's action was undertaken as a disciplinary response to the complainant's misconduct; Re
Lear Seating Canada Inc. and Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, Local 753 (1993), 33
L.A.C. (4th) 307 (Craven), wherein the Board ordered the conditional reinstatement of an employee
who had been terminated for smoking hashish in the employer's parking lot during a lunch break; see
generally Re Fording Coal Ltd. and United Steelworkers of America, Local 7884 (2001), 94 L.A.C.
(4th) 354 at 368 (Hope), wherein it was held by the Board that "a distinction must be made between
the right to privacy and the right to possess marijuana. Privacy is the right recognized in the law.
Possession of marijuana is prohibited under the law, and since its use involves possession, the use of
marijuana must also be taken to be prohibited even though it is not a separate offence. Hence, the
possession and the use of marijuana is not a right possessed by employees which is protected by their
right of privacy."
11. Dupont, supra note 18 at para. 28; Canadian National, 2000, supra note 16 at 386-387.
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abuse problem. Accommodation, therefore, is not an issue affecting the
propriety of imposing a drug or alcohol test, but rather in assessing the
propriety of an employer's response to the results of a drug or alcohol
test. 112 If an employee legitimately claims a disability as the cause of
misconduct, his or her right to accommodation under human rights legisla-
tion arises. Put simply, employers are not required to accommodate casual
or recreational drug or alcohol use that is not the result of a dependency."I3
In that regard, however, many employers find it particularly difficult to
determine whether an employee who claims to be substance-dependent
does so legitimately, or as an attempt to escape the consequences of
culpable behaviour.
Assessing the validity of an employee's claim to be substance-depen-
dent or addicted in considering an appropriate response to what would
otherwise be culpable misconduct can be fraught with difficulty. In the
authors' view, consideration should be given not only to the factual
underpinning of the incident at issue, but also to the employee's employ-
ment history, specifically whether any objective indicia such as exces-
sive absenteeism, unexplained performance inconsistencies, or erratic
behavioural changes in workplace relationships suggest a pattern of drug
or alcohol use. In considering the incident at issue, employers should
pay particular attention to the explanation or lack of explanation offered
by the employee. Absent objective indicia suggesting drug or alcohol
dependency, an employer is within its rights to dismiss an employee's bald
assertion of dependency as an excuse for culpable misconduct and proceed
accordingly. Conversely, if there is evidence suggesting a pattern of drug
or alcohol use, or evidence that raises doubt as to whether an employee is
substance dependent, the employer should treat the employee's claim as
valid and address the incident within the context of accommodation. Such
an approach is judicially sanctioned insofar as employees claiming to be
substance dependent must point to facts from which such an inference can
be reasonably drawn-an employer's duty of accommodation is not trig-
gered by an employee merely raising the possibility that she or he is or has
been perceived to be substance-dependent." 4
As a result of Meiorin, in situations where there is evidence to
112. Irving, supra note 85 at 339-340.
113. See e.g. Ontario Human Rights Commission, Policy on Drug and Alcohol Testing, supra note 54
at 2-3.
114. Middlemiss, supra note 110 at para. 29. See also Ericson v. Collagen Canada Ltd., 1999 Car-
swellBC 3129 at para. 87 (B.C.H.R.T.) (eC).
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suggest an employee is substance-dependent, the propriety of an employ-
er's response to workplace impairment turns on whether it has or can
provide accommodation to the point of undue hardship. 15 In almost
all cases, an employer's duty to accommodate will require, at a mini-
mum, that it facilitate some rehabilitative effort to be undertaken by the
employee. Such accommodation can be effected through employee
assistance programs or employer-assisted referral to treatment or rehabili-
tative programs. While it is incumbent on an employer in most cases to
maintain the employment relationship, it may in so doing impose reason-
able conditions on the employee's return to work, including a requirement
that the employee consent to random post-return-to-work drug or alcohol
testing, on-going substance abuse counseling or reassignment to a less
safety-sensitive workplace or position."6 However, an employer's duty
of accommodation is not without limit. An employer is not required to
continue its accommodative efforts where there is a sound basis to believe
an employee cannot be rehabilitated (e.g., where an alcoholic or drug
addict has been through several rehabilitation programs, but continues to
use drugs or alcohol in a manner affecting work performance). "7
Lastly, regardless of the circumstances of discrimination at issue, an
employer is relieved of its duty to accommodate where to do so would
constitute an undue hardship. As earlier noted, undue hardship can be
established if the cost of providing accommodation would render the
enterprise infeasible, or where, despite accommodative efforts, health or
safety risks to workers, the public or the environment are of such magni-
tude as to outweigh the benefits of providing accommodation. As will be
shown, this latter consideration lies at the heart of applying existing juris-
prudence concerning workplace drug and alcohol policies to the Atlantic
offshore oil industry.
VI. Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Atlantic Offshore Oil Industry
Although employers in the offshore have implemented drug and alcohol
testing policies for more than two decades, there have been no reported
cases in which this practice has been judicially challenged. This may
reflect a universal recognition by unions and employees alike that impair-
115. Meiorin, supra note 49 and accompanying text.
116. Central Alberta Dairy Pool, supra note 52.
117. Civil Liberties, supra note 41 and accompanying text; see also Chopra v. Syncrude Canada Ltd.,
[20031 A.J. No. 741 (Alta. Q.B.) (QL), wherein it was held that an employer had exhausted its duty to
accommodate an employee suffering from alcoholism and was justified in terminating the employment
relationship following the fourth breach of the employer's workplace drug and alcohol policy.
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ment in the offshore is too great a risk to justify a lackadaisical approach
to workplace safety,"' or it may merely reflect that disciplinary sanctions
imposed on employees for drug and alcohol use in the offshore have not
as yet proceeded to full arbitration. Whatever the case, the applicability of
the existing jurisprudence is a question yet to be answered. While employ-
ers are well-advised to consider the foregoing legal principles in develop-
ing and administering drug and alcohol policies, care should be taken to
ensure that such initiatives proceed with appropriate regard for the inher-
ently unique circumstances in the Atlantic offshore oil industry.
1. Human Rights Jurisdiction in the Offshore
Prior to assessing the impact of current jurisprudence on the implementa-
tion of drug and alcohol policies in the offshore, it is first necessary to
determine under which legislative regime an employer is answerable. An
employer in the offshore cannot rule out the possibility of being subject
to two jurisdictional regimes, namely the Canadian Human Rights Act" 9
and either the Newfoundland Human Rights Code2 ' or the Nova Scotia
Human Rights Act.' 2'
Jurisdiction in the offshore is governed by harmonized federal legisla-
tion, respectively, the Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implemen-
tation Act 122 and the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources
Implementation Act 123 (collectively the Accord Acts). The Accord Acts
provide that enumerated "social legislation" from Newfoundland and
Nova Scotia will apply to any "marine installation or structure," which
is defined as including "any ship, offshore drilling unit, production
platform, subsea installation, pumping station, living accommodation,
storage structure, loading or landing platform," but not vessels providing
supply or support services to such structures. '24 Notably, while the Accord
Acts further define applicable "social legislation" from Newfoundland and
Nova Scotia, neither specifically provides that provincial human rights
legislation is applicable to the offshore.
Although there have been no definitive juridical pronouncements on
the applicable human rights regime in the offshore, the jurisprudence
118. "Testing the Limits: Alcohol & Drug Testing for Offshore Employees", supra note 69 at 323.
119. R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 [Canadian Human Rights Act].
120. R.S.N.L. 1990, c. H-14 [Human Rights Code].
121. R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 214 [Human Rights Act].
122. S.C. 1987, c. 3 [Newfoundland Accord Act].
123. S.C. 1988, c. 28 [Nova Scotia Accord Act].
124. Ibid. s. 157(1); Newfoundland Accord Act, supra note 122, s.152(1).
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does indicate that absent a conferral of such authority to the provinces
by Parliament, sole and exclusive jurisdiction on all matters in the off-
shore remains with the federal government. 25 Therefore, as neither of the
Accord Acts explicitly confer human rights jurisdiction in the offshore
to the provinces, it would appear that the Canadian Human Rights Act
applies. Nevertheless, until provincial human rights legislation is added to
the definition of "social legislation" in the Accord Acts, or there is a defini-
tive judicial pronouncement on the issue, it is possible that an employer
could face a complaint lodged with the Newfoundland or Nova Scotia
Human Rights Commission.
2. Comparison of Human Rights Legislation
Ultimately, despite differences in legislative language, each potentially
applicable human rights regime prohibits discrimination on the basis
of disability or perceived disability due to alcohol or drug dependency
and each regime is subject to the ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Meorin. There is, however, one notable difference: while both the
Canadian Human Rights Act and the Newfoundland Human Rights Code
provide protection for current disability, 2 6 the Nova Scotia Human Rights
Act provides protection against discrimination only on the basis of "previ-
ous dependency.' 1 27 It could therefore be argued that discrimination on the
basis of a current dependency problem may not offend the Nova Scotia
Human Rights Act,' 25 whereas the converse would be the case under the
Newfoundland or federal regimes. 129 The Nova Scotia argument, however,
would only be available if it is determined that the Canadian Human
Rights Act does not apply to the offshore; a result that seems somewhat
dubious without further amendment of the Accord Acts.
3. Balancing Rights and Risks in the Atlantic Offshore
Whether framed as an issue of management rights under KVP or human
rights under Meiorin, the issue to be decided if and when drug and alcohol
policies in the Atlantic offshore oil industry are challenged can be simply
125. S.I.U. v. Crosbie Offshore Services Ltd., 1982 CarswellNat 49 (F.C.A.) (eC), leave to appeal to
S.C.C. refused (1981), 135 D.L.R. (3d) 485 (S.C.C.); see also S.I.U. v. Tap Catering & Management
Ltd., 1983 CarswellNat 613 (CLRB) (eC).
126. Canadian Human Rights Act, supra note 119, s.25; Human Rights Code, supra note 120, s.2(l).
127. Human Rights Act, supra note 121, s.3(l)(vii); see also Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission
Policy Compendium, c.2, s.2.17.3, in which it is stated that "the Commissions will accept complaints
of discrimination based on previous dependencies on alcohol or drugs."
128. "Testing the Limits: Alcohol & Drug Testing for Offshore Employees", supra note 69 at 325.
129. But see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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stated: Where should the line be drawn between managing the potentially
catastrophic risks of an impairment-related incident in the offshore and an
employee's right to privacy?
In Meiorin, the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized that in order to
comply with human rights legislation employers cannot set uncompromis-
ing standards without establishing that to do otherwise would constitute an
undue hardship. 3 ° The same principle holds true in respect of workplace
drug and alcohol policies, whether in assessing the legitimacy of testing
per se, or the consequences imposed by such a policy on employees who
test positive for drug or alcohol use. Though the jurisprudence is clear that
undue hardship is established if it can be shown that the benefits of provid-
ing accommodation are outweighed by the health or safety risks to work-
ers or members of the public, this proposition has never been judicially
tested in the offshore context vis-ti-vis workplace impairment.' 3
In assessing the safety risks posed by failing to test for drug or
alcohol use or permitting an employee with an active dependency to
continue working in a safety-sensitive position, four considerations arise:
the type of the risk, the consequences of the risk, the probability of the risk
materializing,'32 and, of inestimable import, the identification of those who
bear the risk.'33 In this regard, history is our best authority and we cannot
ignore either the tragic loss of life on the Ocean Ranger or the crippling
environmental and economic damage caused by the Exxon Valdez, the
effects of which are felt to the present day. These are the risks to be
managed and recent history demonstrates their compelling force.
Many authorities have recognized that reducing the stringency of an
employer rule or standard can compromise public safety and special rec-
ognition and weight must be given to the public interest in determining
whether any abatement of the rule is possible without imposing an undue
hardship. 3 4 As noted by the Federal Court of Appeal in Mahon v. Cana-
130. Meiorin, supra note 49 at para. 62.
131. Supra notes 52-53; see generally "Testing the Limits: Alcohol & Drug Testing for Offshore
Employees," supra note 69.
132. Kevin D. MacNeill, The Duty to Accommodate in Employment, vol. 1, looseleaf (Aurora, Ont.:
Canada Law Book Inc., 2003) at para. 12:40:30.
133. Ibid. at para. 12:40:40.
134. See e.g. Zinck v. Halifax (City) Fire Dept.[1990] N.S.H.R.B.I.D. No. 2 (Yogis) (QL), aff'd
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a job-related requirement that, according to the evidence, is reasonably
necessary to eliminate a real risk of a serious damage to the public at large
must be said to be a bonafide occupational requirement....
The decision under attack, it seems to me, is based on the generous idea
that the employers and the public have the duty to accept and assume
some risks of damage in order to enable disabled persons to find work. In
my view, the law does not impose any such duty on anyone.
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In the context of accommodating substance-dependent employees in the
offshore oil industry, the issue becomes whether the benefits of accom-
modation outweigh the risks attendant upon allowing substance-depen-
dent employees to work in an environment in which even a momentary
lapse in judgement could have tragic consequences. In the authors' view,
whether an employee is actually substance-dependent or merely perceived
to be so is irrelevant to this determination. An individual with a perceived
disability is entitled to no greater protection than someone suffering from
an actual drug and/or alcohol dependency.
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Given the gravity of the additional risks inherent in the offshore oil
industry, and the dire consequences that could result from an impairment-
related incident, employers would be well-advised to use every means
at their disposal to minimize the risk of workplace impairment. Though
employee privacy is a right to be judiciously guarded, it cannot take
precedence over the necessity of taking every available measure to prevent
incalculable loss of life and environmental ruination. Thus, as a general
proposition, the authors suggest that the more risk-sensitive an industry
and more serious consequences of an impairment-related incident to the
public interest, the more justifiable are the measures aimed at reducing the
risk of workplace impairment. Any other conclusion would run afoul of
both common sense and the prevailing jurisprudence.
135. 1987 CarswellNat 199 (F.C.A.) at paras. 25-26, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1987), 86 N.R.
263.
136. Canadian National, 2000, supra note 16 at 386.
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Conclusion
If the foregoing analysis has demonstrated anything, it is that the struggle
to balance employee privacy rights with risk management policies utilizing
drug and alcohol testing is fraught with difficulty. Though Entrop appears
to have ushered in trends of judicial consistency, all the authorities to date
have developed in the context of land-based industries. The jurisprudence
will undoubtedly influence the resolution of workplace drug and alcohol
issues when and if they are judicially tested in the offshore. However,
the law is neither rote nor mechanical. As noted recently by the Supreme
Court of Canada, "the common law reflects the experience of the past, the
reality of modern social concerns and a sensitivity to the future."'37 While
it is unknown where courts, arbitrators and human rights adjudicators
will draw the line between employee privacy and managing the risk of an
impairment-related incident in the offshore, it can be safely assumed that
the lessons of history will not and should not easily be forgotten.
137. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) v. R.W.D.S.U., Local 558, 2002 CarswellSask 22 (S.C.C.)
(eC) at para. 19.

